Unbalancing power from Gulf to China: The new Great Game

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For 10 years Central Asia has been caught up in a new "great game" designed to fill the gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. By deploying its forces in the Red Army’s former bases in Uzbekistan, Washington is demonstrating how its influence has spread since the cold war ended. But United States intervention in the region also involves sensitive negotiations with states of differing political interests, and that may have cost implications for the US.

Since 1991 Washington has been trying to divert Russian influence from Central Asia and the Caucasus, and keep Iranian influence there to a minimum. Instead, the US has encouraged Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to cooperate with Pakistan, and Transcaucasia to cooperate with Russia. Another main principle of US strategy is to use the oil and gas pipelines exporting energy from the Caspian Sea to control the newly independent states.

The current war has undermined the rationale underpinning this strategy. The trade in oil and planned pipelines will become less important as the air bases, intelligence services and military assume greater significance. What is more, the West’s partners are causing it serious problems. The US, for example, is no longer able to count on its long-standing allies in Islamabad and Riyadh. Both may be allowing the US air force to use their air bases but, officially at least-, not as bases for attacks on Afghanistan. That is why the US administration has had to negotiate with Moscow the right to conduct military operations from landlocked Uzbekistan. And the fact that the US wants to use the Northern Alliance to help fight the Taliban is enhancing the logistical importance of Tajikistan, the rearward base of the anti-Taliban coalition.

Russia’s top military is not keen on the barely concealed presence of US troops. Two days after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov commented: “I see nothing to justify Nato deployment in the states of Central Asia” (1). But that was not the policy of President Vladimir Putin: he declared his readiness to cooperate with the Americans. The question was what it would cost to bring the Russian leadership on board. What would Moscow get in exchange for participating in the "anti-terrorist" coalition? Its passport to the "western club", as Washington is promising? Closer links with the European Union in exchange for abandoning its former republics in the East? Entry into Nato? (see the article by Nina Bachkatov).

On 4 October the latent war between Georgia and Abkhazia flared up again (2). According to Russian sources, Georgian guerrillas, backed by Chechen fighters, attacked Abkhaz villages. Under pressure from Georgia, Putin said that he was ready to withdraw Russian peace-keeping troops from Abkhazia. Does this mark the first stage in Russia’s disengagement from the Community of Independent States - a matter of concern in Moscow - or the redeployment of Russian forces in Georgia, the gateway to the Caucasus?

Turkey is unequivocal in its support of Washington. The Incirlik air base, used by US jets for patrols in Iraq, is being used for bombing missions to Afghanistan. Ankara is also prepared to make elite troops available for missions inside the country. For Turkey, economically fragile and in an ambiguous position since the end of the cold war, this conflict provides an opportunity to show the West the advantages it has to offer - particularly since Turkey has been largely overshadowed by Russia since September. But, like the Russians, the Turks have no desire to see Washington extend the war to other countries, especially Iraq.

The West’s uncertainty over the role of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and continuing doubts about their loyalty to Washington have meant that Iran, situated between the two, with an exceptional geopolitical position, is being increasingly courted by Washington and London. The Sunni fundamentalist movements have, after all, taken the place of Lebanon’s Hezbollah as Washington’s enemy number one. But the Iranian government is concerned about the long-term deployment of troops along its northern frontier. And it intends boosting its military capability in the coming years: hence the signing in Moscow of arms contracts worth more than $300m a year.

The destabilisation in Afghanistan holds out new prospects for India and Pakistan too. Both are looking at Afghan policy in terms of their conflict in Kashmir. In the past New Delhi has fuelled the territorial conflicts between Kabul and Islamabad, leaving Pakistani forces split between two fronts. There is evidence that the conflict is continuing. A car bomb exploded on 1 October in Srinagar, the summer capital of Indian Kashmir. Then, on 15 October, India fired on Pakistani troops along the line of control, despite the fact that US Secretary of State Colin Powell was touring the region at the time.

The situation in Kashmir is also of concern to China, which has long supported the Pakistani military there. But Beijing is concerned at the increasing militancy of the 8m Uigars living in the west of Xinjiang province. Involved in Muslim fundamentalism and drug-trafficking, the Uigars are able to utilise the Afghan and Pakistani networks. The Chinese leadership had been trying to improve its bilateral links with the Taliban. In fact, on the day of the World Trade Centre attacks, a high level Chinese delegation was in Pakistan to discuss economic cooperation with the Taliban. Beijing is also unhappy about increased cooperation between the US and the Uzbeks, particularly if it becomes a permanent arrangement.